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1 THE MODERNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT
Although since the 1970s community property law has been modified several
times on more or less important or subordinate points, our community
property law remains an important focus of interest. I should like to draw
attention to the question already posed by Schoordijk in 1996 whether a
marriage settlement also applies in the event of changed circumstances.1When
amarriage settlement is made, attention is focused on entering into a marriage
on the one hand, and on the other hand on dissolution of the marriage, es-
pecially in the event of divorce. In the intervening period everything is relative-
ly peaceful and there appears to be little need for a legal arrangement.
When discussing a marriage settlement we may distinguish between
different phases.
2 ENTERING INTO THE MARRIAGE
Quite recently it was discussed in de ‘Tweede Kamer’ (the Lower House)
whether it was desirable to make it mandatory for intending spouses to make
a marriage settlement or to go to a notary to discuss whether a marriage
settlement with some substance should be entered into. For the time being
it has not materialized, but I believe that it is not desirable either.
Inmy opinion the community of property is the ideal system for commun-
ity property for the majority of young couples. It is the pinnacle of solidarity:
sharing the sweet and the bitter, not only the gains but also the burdens.
Naturally this may be unpleasant in certain circumstances, for instance
if one of the spouses is an entrepreneur without personnel and has bitten off
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1 H.C.F. Schoordijk, ‘De betekenis van de rechtswetenschap voor het notariaat’,WPNR 1996
(6207), pp. 11-17 even suggests the hypothesis that science has neglected this question.
Schoordijk wrote his article, by the way, mainly on the basis of the subordinated position
of women. ‘A smart girl prepares for her future’. After fifteen years that is perhaps an
obsolete slogan, in view of both the absolute and the relative power of women in the lecture
halls. The principle of desirability of flexible marriage settlements is not changed by that.
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more than he can chew, i.e. taken too great a risk, as a result of which not
only he but also his spouse runs into bankruptcy problems. If only they had
known! And that exactly seems to be what probably motivated the Kamer:
not the necessity ofmaking amarriage settlement but familiarity with the legal
aspects of the matter. In my opinion that need not be done by making a
marriage settlement or even by going to a notary, but by simply having the
Registrar of Births, Deaths andMarriages andRegistered Partnerships provide
information about the proprietary consequences of the marriage or the
registered partnership when notice is given of the marriage or the registered
partnership: even if it is only a leaflet.
3 MAKING A MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT
When it later appears that a marriage settlement is desirable after all, the
question is in what way this should be realized. The law on family property
and therefore also the contents of a marriage settlement change as circum-
stances in society change.
That also applies to the perception of the continuing performance contract
that a marriage settlement is.2
In principle a marriage settlement is made for a whole life or at any rate
for a whole marriage. But what if the internal or external circumstances of
the marriage change?
In my opinion there are two ways to deal with that: either the marriage
settlement is so flexible that it already provides for the change in those circum-
stances, or an arrangement is included in the marriage settlement that the
marriage settlement will be revised if the circumstances change.
Both cases will be discussed in more detail.
4 THE PREAMBLE
Several times3 I have advocated the inclusion of a preamble in the marriage
settlement. While the marriage settlement must naturally be clear, it may still
be advisable to begin the marriage settlement with the considerations of the
parties, stating why precisely they chose this settlement and how this settle-
ment is to be interpreted.
What exactly is a preamble? My dictionary gives as the meaning for the
Dutch word for preamble: ‘a motive, an introductory paragraph of a law, a
judgment, giving the considerations onwhich they are based’. A Latin diction-
2 See T.J. Mellema-Kranenburg, ‘De houdbaarheidsdatum van huwelijksvoorwaarden’,
Tijdschrift Relatierecht en Praktijk 2010, p. 175.
3 See also Mellema-Kranenburg loc. cit.
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ary gives as the meaning for the sameword: ‘reflect on, take into consideration,
be aware of’. In my view all these cases may be grouped under the concept
of an explanation of another item. The preamble is not a component of the
marriage settlement, but rephrases what the parties on both sides4 may expect
of the contents of the marriage settlement.
Naturally good information by the notary is essential on that occasion.
Sending the clients a questionnaire beforehand to prepare for the discussion
of the marriage settlement is indispensable in that context. This is not a plea
for always including a preamble in every marriage settlement. The main rule
remains that the wording of the marriage settlement should be clear and not
capable of more than one interpretation. The exceptional thing about the
marriage settlement contract is, however, that its significance often only
becomes an issuemany years later. As long as themarriage proceeds smoothly,
the marriage settlement is kept in the bottom drawer, but only when the first
cracks appear in the marriage, does the significance of the marriage settlement
become relevant and may it be that the texts drawn up twenty years ago are
suddenly not as clear anymore as they appeared to be at that time. In case
law we see that an important role is played by the fact that the parties are
aware of the consequences of a construction chosen when the marriage is
entered into, see for instance the judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court of
15 February 2008, NJ 2008, 110.
This concerned the question whether the right of compensation due to the
husband on the strength of moneys withdrawn from the community for the
construction of the marital home – built on a plot acquired privately by the
wife by virtue of a testamentary disposition – had to be set at a nominal
amount.
The Dutch Supreme Court held:
‘The right to compensation in principle refers to the same amount as the one
withdrawn from the community in the past. On the grounds of reasonableness
and fairness that govern the relationship between the co-owners an exceptionmay
be made for this in such a way that (part of) the increase in value realized by this
amount must also be compensated to the community. According to standards of
reasonableness and fairness it is unacceptable that the wife merely returns to the
husband the amount received in the past without any increase in the value of the
dwelling’.
Subsequently the Dutch Supreme Court lists the relevant circumstances, with
several considerations attributing an important role to the circumstance that
the parties had or had not intended a certain legal consequence or had been
aware of it.
4 Dutch Supreme Court 13March 1981,NJ 1981, 635, with commentary fromCJHB (Haviltex).
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‘When a nominal obligation of compensation of the wife is taken as a starting-point,
the husband cannot benefit from this contribution. In that way the husbandwould
actually have relinquished a future increase in value of the first joint home to enable
the wife to build the relevant dwelling as private property, so that only she benefits
from the dwelling. It has neither appeared nor been stated that the parties had been
aware of this consequence.
The acquisition of the land and the dwelling by the woman in private follows
from the last will of her father and is not based on a deliberate choice of the parties;
they were married in the statutory community of property, from which it follows
that they share equally in the increase/decrease in value of the goods that are part
of the community.’ [italics TJMK]
These considerations show that the Dutch Supreme Court attaches importance
to the parties’ awareness of the legal consequences of their community property
system for the applicability of statutory (in this case community of property
with nominal rights of compensation) or contractual rules of community
property law. Whether this awareness is present may be inferred from a
properly formulated preamble in which, apart from certain rules from the
marriage settlement, especially the legal consequences attaching to them are
emphasized.
Furthermore it may be true that the spouses have meanwhile got into
different circumstances, for instance have gone to to live in another country,
in which case the marriage settlement may have to be assessed by a foreign
court. Then, too, the text in the preamble can play an important role in the
interpretation of the marriage settlement. This will especially be the case in
countries that are accustomed to provisions resembling the preamble, such
as in Anglo-Saxon countries. But the preamblemay play a significant role also
in our country, where reasonableness and fairness are gradually beginning
to play a role in existing marriage settlements.
The preamble may make the meaning of the marriage settlement clearer
to the foreign court than the wording alone, leaving aside the translation link
that must be made with the marriage settlement.
5 THE REVISION CLAUSE
It is also possible, however, to evaluate the marriage settlement after a few
years by including a revision clause5 in themarriage settlement. The preamble
could include, for instance, that the parties intend to reconsider the marriage
settlement five years after the start of the marriage and to adjust it to the
circumstances in which the parties are then. The circumstances could for
instance have changed in the sense that after the birth of children the wife
5 See Mellema-Kranenburg, loc. cit. p. 176; See also L.H.M. Zonnenberg, Het verrekenbeding
(thesis Open University of the Netherlands), Deventer: Kluwer 2009, p. 327.
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(or the husband) has started to work considerably less, as a result of which
he or she generates less income. That could, for instance, lead to making a
change in the way that incomes are settled. But even less foreseeable circum-
stances, such as the loss of a job or occurrence of occupational disability, could
make a reconsideration desirable. It is also conceivable that tangible circum-
stances are listed thatmust lead to reconsideration of themarriage settlement.
The question is, however, howmuch such an intention is worth. Let us assume
that the wife wants to reconsider, but the husband does not. In that case the
intention is not enforceable. In principle the intention only has a moral value,
a natural obligation that people impose on each other, but is not enforceable.
The intention could be strengthened by formulating it in the form of a
condition in themarriage settlement (article 3:38 Dutch Civil Code, hereinafter
DCC). Then the condition will have to be given substance, though, for instance
that the contents of the marriage settlement must be reconsidered if one of
the parties no longer receives income from employment. If subsequently one
of the parties defaults, the parties now agree for that future event to reach
a solution by means of a mediator. Such a condition could be formulated in
the article about the costs of the household or the settlement of income.
As such the reconsideration is given much more weight, but if things
should get this far between the spouses, the days of the marriage also appear
to be numbered.
On the other hand: precisely with a view to an impending divorce it may be
very important for (one of) the parties to put everything into perspective.
6 REVISION ON THE STRENGTH OF THE LAW
Should it be so that the intention uttered in the preamble is not enforceable
on the strength of the marriage settlement or that no preamble or revision
clause has been included in the marriage settlement at all, one may wonder
whether an alteration of themarriage settlement is not possible on the strength
of the law.
7 THE SUPPLEMENTARY AND LIMITING EFFECTS OF REASONABLENESS AND
FAIRNESS
In the first place consideration may be given to the supplementary effect of
reasonableness and fairness (article 6:248(1) DCC). Let us assume that the parties
have concluded a marriage settlement in which the husband takes the costs
of the household for his account. The husband becomes occupationally dis-
abled. I believe that in that case the interests of each of the parties and the
circumstances of the special case (occupational disability) may entail that the
marriage settlement is supplemented with the obligation for the wife to con-
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tribute to the costs of the household as well.6 Precisely in the continuing
performance contract of amarriage settlement the existence of reasonableness
and fairness will play a role. In my opinion that role of reasonableness and
fairness will decrease asmore has been ‘spelled out’ in themarriage settlement
(or even the preamble). For that matter I believe that with the supplementary
effect of reasonableness and fairness the contractual provisions themselves
will remain intact; they will therefore not be altered, as in article 6:258 DCC,
to be discussed below.
Moreover, thought may be given to the limiting effect of reasonableness
and fairness (article 6:248(2) DCC). In this connection it must first be determined
what the contents of the marriage settlement are. If the contents are clear and
no problems of interpretation occur, it may still be true that observance of
the contents agreed may prove very bitter. An example of the applicability
of the limiting effect of reasonableness and fairness is the judgment of the
Dutch Supreme Court on 18 June 2004, NJ 2004, 399. The case was as follows:
the husband and wife made a marriage settlement during the marriage
exclusively to protect the joint property from possible future creditors of the
husband. They continued to behave, however, as if they were married in
community of property.
When it then came to a divorce, the Court of Appeal held that the marriage
settlement was clear and not susceptible of different interpretations. But then
the Dutch Supreme Court:
‘4.3 Insofar as the ground for appeal resists the consideration of the Court of Appeal
that even the demands of reasonableness and fairness cannot detract from the
marriage settlement agreed between the parties, it succeeds, because with this
judgment the Court of Appeal has failed to recognize that a rule in force between
the parties by virtue of a marriage settlement does not apply insofar as this is
unacceptable in the given circumstances according to standards of reasonableness
and fairness (cp. inter alia Dutch Supreme Court 25 November 1988, NJ 1989, 529
and Dutch Supreme Court 29 September 1995, NJ 1996, 88). In that connection it
should be noted that when answering the question whether in the settlement of
accounts between former spouses after dissolution of the marriage the marriage
settlement must be deviated from on the strength of reasonableness and fairness,
importancemay definitely be attached tomutually corresponding behaviour during
the marriage, even if that behaviour deviated from the marriage settlement.’
Naturally amarriage settlement constitutes a very special type of contract with
its own statutory provisions of community property law.Nevertheless I should
6 For thatmatter it would also be possible here to rely on the limiting effect of reasonableness
and fairness because it is contrary to reasonableness and fairness to discover that reliance
is placed on the provision that the husbandwill take the costs of the households exclusively
for his account.
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not want to rule out the limiting effect of reasonableness and fairness under
certain circumstances.7
Even if reliance on reasonableness and fairness should succeed, that will
still not lead to an alteration of the marriage settlement, at most to not applying
a provision included in the marriage contract.
8 UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES (ARTICLE 6:258 DCC)
It is possible, however, to go one step further and assert that even if there is
no preamble and revision clause included in a marriage settlement at all, the
other spouse may ask the court for a revision of the agreement because of a
change of circumstances (article 6:258 DCC). Reasonableness and fairness may
then entail that a change of circumstances leads to an alteration of themarriage
settlement.8
In this connection a role is played by the question to what extent the
‘imprévision’ rule of article 6:258 DCCmay be applied to the special agreement
of a marriage settlement.
Arguments pleading against change were already listed by Schoordijk in
1996:9
a. the public-law elements that the marriage settlement comprises are not
susceptible of change;
b. legal certainty is endangered by an alteration of the marriage settlement;
c. how heavily must changed circumstances weigh to justify an alteration
of the marriage settlement?
With regard to the public-law elements (a) I fully agree with Schoordijk: first
of all agreements with a public element are also susceptible of alteration,
secondly it is highly debatable how public a marriage settlement is. In my
view marriage itself contains elements of public law but the property law
system is purely a matter of private law.
With regard to legal certainty (b): naturally there is always a certain tension
between legal certainty and reasonableness and fairness but the legislator has
7 See also J. van Duijvendijk-Brand, Afrekenen bij (echt)scheiding (thesis Leiden), Deventer:
Kluwer 1990, pp. 120-121.
8 See Van Duijvendijk-Brand 1990, pp. 121-122; Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 2010 (6-III*),
nr. 441; W.L. Valk, ‘De door de rechter te betrachten terughoudendheid in geval van
onvoorziene omstandigheden’, NTBR 1994, pp. 258-260; M. Antolskaia, B. Breederveld,
L. Hulst, W. Kolkman, F. Salomons & L. Verstappen, Koude Uitsluiting (Report by researchers
of the VU and the RUG), Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2011, pp. 37-44; see also
Dutch Supreme Court 18 June 2004,NJ 2004, 399; Dutch Supreme Court 10 June 2010, RvdW
2010, 811; LJN BM4649; Dutch Supreme Court 29 September 1995, NJ 1996, 88 (milk quota
judgment).
9 See Schoordijk 1996, p. 15.
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an open mind if adherence to existing contracts leads to unacceptable conse-
quences, as appears inter alia from article 6:258 DCC.
From this it follows logically that the changed circumstances must be
reasonably drastic (c) and – especially – not anticipated. A next question is:
should one rather exercise restraint with the application of the rule from the
general law of obligations or is a more generous application appropriate here
in view of the nature and the contents of themarriage settlement? For the time
being case law practises restraint. Before the implementation of the new Civil
Code the future appeared to hold the use of reasonableness and fairness,
witness the Kriek/Smit judgment.10 In summary this concerned a dwelling
that had been registered in the husband’s name with the wife’s money. The
parties had been married with the exclusion of any form of community
property. After the divorce the house was sold with a substantial profit. In
principle the wife was only entitled to repayment of the same amount as she
had made available to the husband for the financing of the dwelling. The
surplus value would then have benefited the husband entirely. The Dutch
Supreme Court, however, considered a correction appropriate owing to the
unforeseen circumstances at the time of the purchase and stated:
‘In that connection it will depend on the question whether the relevant unforeseen
circumstances are of such a nature that the spouse in whose name the house is
registered may not expect in accordance with standards of reasonableness and
fairness that it will be enough for him to merely return the amount made available
in the past without any settlement of the increase in value of the dwelling.’
However, after this there have not been many feats to report in the field of
unforeseen circumstances in community property law. In case law a few
attempts were made on the subject, such as for instance in the ’Hilversum
catering’ judgment,11 but there the Dutch Supreme Court stayed with the
exclusion of every community agreed between the parties. Much is written
about this subject, however, especially in relation to the concept of ‘koude
uitsluiting’(i.e. exclusion under a matrimonial contract precluding any claim
by one spouse on assets accruing to the other spouse during the marriage,
hereinafter ‘cold exclusion’).
A difficult point when relying on unforeseen circumstances is to determine
when it is a matter of circumstances that were unforeseen when the agreement,
i.e. the marriage settlement, was entered into. In that connection the issue is
what supposition the parties took as a basis: did they or did they not want
to provide for the possibility of the occurrence of the unforeseen circumstances
10 Dutch Supreme Court 12 June 1987, NJ 1988, 150, with commentary from E.A.A.L. (Kriek/
Smit).
11 Dutch Supreme Court 25 November 1988, NJ 1989, 529.
Tea Mellema-Kranenburg 67
or, at any rate, did they tacitly take that possibility into account.12 As the
relevant circumstances are less remote from the imaginative powers or actual
conceptions of the parties, the belief will sooner be created that theywere taken
into account (article 3:35 DCC).13 When we apply this to a marriage settlement,
it must therefore be true that the circumstances that cause inequities did not
already exist when the marriage settlement was concluded and that in the
agreement the parties did not reckonwith the occurrence of the circumstances
either.
The expectations that the spouses had when entering into the marriage
settlement therefore play an important role.14
In view of my earlier suggestions concerning the preamble, the answer
to that question should be easy in the presence of a preamble.
In the Koude Uitsluiting (Cold Exclusion) report15 it is concluded that
in legal practice material problems occur in the event of ‘cold exclusion’ and
a number of solutions are presented.
There the specific fairness correction is also mentioned in the event that
owing to changed circumstances the provisions of the marriage settlement
had become unacceptably unfavourable for the former spouse who has or has
not undertaken (part of) the care for the children. There is also mention of
amore general fairness correction, consisting of the possibility of setting aside
or adjusting a marriage settlement comprising a ‘cold exclusion’, if it is un-
reasonable in view of all the circumstances of the case.
I count myself among the persons who believe that for such a fairness
correction a change of law is not necessary, but that application of article 6:258
DCC leads to the desired result. That does not only apply to the marriage
settlements that entail ‘cold exclusion’ but also tomarriage settlements whose
shelf life has expired for other reasons.16
In the above I asked the question whether with regard to marriage settle-
ments the general imprévision rule of article 6:258 DCC should perhaps be
applied with restraint. I think the opposite is the case. A marriage settlement
constitutes a continuing performance agreement, concluded for a long period
whose course is hard to survey. Moreover, this concerns parties who have
an affectionate relationship with each other. Naturally the rule ‘contract is
12 See TM, Parl. Gesch. Boek 6, p. 98 and p. 973; Valk 2009 (T&C BW), art. 6:258 DCC, note 2.
13 See Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 2009 6 III*, no. 441.
14 See the Koude Uitsluiting report, p. 37.
15 A report about the bottlenecks in Cold Exclusion (and unmarried cohabitation) issued by
order of the Ministry of Justice by lawyers of the University of Groningen and the Free
University.
16 See also VanDuijvendijk-Brand 1990, pp. 121-122;M.J.A. vanMourik, ‘Huwelijkse voorwaar-
den en de eisen van redelijkheid en billijkheid’,WPNR 1987 (5811), pp. 1-5; H.C.F. Schoor-
dijk, ‘Amerikaanse huwelijkse voorwaarden en koude uitsluiting’,WPNR 1989 (5914), pp.
251-255. See furthermore the Koude Uitsluiting report, p. 308 and the literature mentioned
in it in note 2.
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contract’ also applies there. Legal certainty demands it. Still, if there is a case
of unforeseen circumstances anywhere, it is here.17 Even if there is superb
information, with questionnaires, which I applaud, as said, and even if, as
suggested in the report on Cold Exclusion, every party has its own adviser,
nevertheless life and therefore also a marriage may turn out differently than
had been foreseen or was foreseeable. Hence my request to legal practitioners
but especially to the judiciary: please apply article 6:258 DCC generously here!
9 ALTERATION OF THE MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT ON THE GROUND OF A
NATURAL OBLIGATION
If the marriage settlement does not imply an enforceable alteration of the
marriage settlement and there is no legal ground for alteration either, there
may be a natural obligation to alter the marriage settlement on the ground
of a compelling moral duty (article 6:3(2)(b) DCC). Whether it is a question
of a natural obligation depends on social views and must be assessed in
accordance with objective criteria. Subjective standards play no role in this.18
In that connection the court must decide what the substance is of the views
generally held in society. Where duties of care are relevant, a role will be
reserved in particular for the existence of a natural obligation. See on the
subject the judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court of 9 November 1990, NJ
1992, 212 (Nahar/Cornes) andDutch Supreme Court 15 September 1995,NJ 1996,
616.
On the ground of these duties of care one spouse may for instance have
the duty to ensure that the other spouse may continue to live in the matri-
monial home even if the house is registered in the name of the other spouse
and the spouses are married with the exclusion of any form of community
property.19
The problem at work here is that the natural obligation is not enforceable
(article 6:3(1) DCC). This means that co-operation of both spouses is required
to ‘convert’ the natural obligation into an obligation that is legally enforceable.
If such co-operation is not possible, it may be possible, after having estab-
lished that it is a question of a natural obligation, to ask the court for an
alteration of the marriage settlement. That, in turn, naturally raises the problem
that the circumstances must be unforeseen, which is not always the case with
the existence of a natural obligation. If we cannot rely on article 6:258 DCC
in this case, we might consider article 6:248 DCC.
If it is a question of a natural obligation between the parties, reasonableness
and fairness entail, taking account of the interests of both parties and the
17 Schoordijk, loc. cit. speaks in this connection about the vicissitudes of life.
18 See also the Koude Uitsluiting report p. 54.
19 See Dutch Supreme Court 17 October 1997, NJ 1998, 692.
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circumstances of the specific case, that themarriage settlement is supplemented
or limited to what is reasonable and fair between the parties.
10 CONCLUSION
Society is changing constantly. Persons change. The community property
system often needs maintenance. This may be done by the spouses revising
their marriage settlement or even their system of property. Often they will
need a little help for that purpose. This may be done by including a provision
in the marriage settlement that in the event of a change of circumstances they
will revise their marriage settlement.
If such a provision has not been included and/or spouses are not prepared
to co-operate in a revision of the marriage settlement, it is possible to rely on
reasonableness and fairness in certain circumstances. In that connection it is
possible to consider reliance on the supplementary or limiting effect of article
6:248 DCC, as a result of which the marriage settlement is supplemented or
some specific provision from the marriage settlement may not be relied on.
Even more drastic is reliance on article 6:258 DCC, on the strength of which
the court may alter the marriage settlement (possibly strengthened by the
existence of a natural obligation). So far, however, the courts have been very
reluctant in the application of article 6:258 DCC. I hope I have shown that under
certain circumstances they may definitely apply article 6:258 DCC.

